Although Aristotle goes into great detail outlining several instances of fallacious arguments, I think Perelman is correct in casting all those reasons into one solid argument. If your audience is unwilling to accept the premises of your argument, they will not concede your point.

Perelman may be correct in asserting that there are no fallacies; however misleading an audience to prove one’s argument must be called something, and “an often plausible argument using false or invalid inference” must be called something. It seems from the brief description we were given that Perelman wants to contend that the categories we assign to fallacies are invalid and that there is only one kind of fallacy, but not others. I would argue that there must be at least one other category in addition to Perelman’s: a rhetor arguing something he knows not to be the case in order to deceive an audience. Whether or not Perelman wants to call it a “fallacy,” a fallacious argument is still a fallacious argument. It is also if nothing else an irresponsible one. What might Perelman make of a dishonest car mechanic taking advantage of an old lady who doesn’t know any better? Lets say the old lady wants to fix the squealing in her brakes. She needs only new brake pads to fix her brakes and the mechanic tells her she needs new rotors, a much more expensive proposition. The mechanic is thus arguing that the squealing in her brakes is caused by some problem with her rotors, when he knows that it is only old brake pads that are causing the problem. The old lady accepts his premises and conclusion, yet is this not a “plausible argument using false or invalid inference” in which the old lady accepted the premises? Perelman may not want to label this argument a fallacy, but that doesn’t change the fact that it is.

I agree with Aristotle in his views on fallacies. A fallacy is basically just an error in reasoning. Take for instance the fallacy "Ad Hominem". This fallacy states that an arguement is false simply because of facts already known about the person posing the arguement.

Example:
A school teacher makes a claim regarding her views on the importance of higher education.
Person B makes an attack on person A saying that she would say that because she is a school teacher.
Therefore A's claim is false (Person B feels like she has to say that because she is a school teacher)

As Chris stated in his post, " I believe that just because a certain audience might accept what another might consider a fallacy does not make the argument any less false, it just means that your audience agrees with you anyway." So in this situation, Person B has seen a fallacy being commited, while the general audience agrees with the school teacher. Looked at another way, what if your audience was full of grad students? Could you then agree with Perelman and say that no fallacy has been committed, "only mistaken assumptions about what the audience already believes?"

I suppose I am also going to take the middle ground and grudgingly agree that both Aristotle and Perelman are at least somewhat correct. I cannot deny that if, like Perelman says, an audience accepts an argument then they did not find the logic to be flawed. Nevertheless, assuming that thing B was a result of thing A just because it happened after it is a logical fallacy. Maybe whether it is a rhetorical fallacy depends upon the aim of rhetoric, persuasiveness or Truth. And so a knowledge of types of fallacies is beneficial to the advocate so that he may persuade even when he is wrong and to the judge so that he may know if he is being misled.

Though I see Aristotle's point that flawed logic exists in many arguments, I side more with Perelman in his assertion that the only costly mistake that can be made by a speaker is to misinterpret the stance of his audiences concerning the premises to his argument. While I do feel that in some cases there really is a clear right and wrong (according to the higher universal law to which Aristotle so often refers, citing Antigone) I believe that absolute truth, being perhaps the most sought after concept in history, is also the most elusive, forcing us to rely on our own opinions and those of others. Truth thus becomes relative, and the right conclusion becomes the one at which most people arrive. The example Aristotle cited most often was the struggle to define the actions of Orestes. Was he guilty of slaying his mother or was he a victor over injustice and the avenger of his father's death? In the end, the truth was determined by vote, revealing the power of the majority even over the Furies. So it seems that an effective argument, while it may not lead to absolute truth, may be enough to win over the majority.

Like Chris Edwards, I agree that Aristotle and Perelman are neither right nor wrong, but are both somewhat right. I’ll follow Aristotle that just because a certain audience accepts something to be true does not necessarily mean that it is. Another audience might accept that same something to be false, in which case, we must then wonder exactly who is right—the latter audience could claim a fallacy, while the former would not. This reminds me of Stanley Fish’s theory that an author’s rhetoric is essentially devoid of any meaning except for the meaning that the audience, or reader, will give it. Just as audiences change, so do the meanings (and the proclamations of either right or wrong).

I’ll also acknowledge Perelman to an extent on the notion of no “hard and fast” fallacies, because I wonder: How can one ever arrive at an answer of yes or no, right or wrong, when a given argument is going to be received differently by different audiences? We don’t have an objective language that can be viewed as unwavering (where everything, every word, will mean the same to everybody), thus guaranteeing that every audience will acknowledge something as either completely right or completely wrong. Continuing with Stanley Fish’s argument, I agree that anything the reader considers “right” is, in fact, right, for the sole reason that meaning is derived from the audience, not the author. It is the reception, not the intention, which ultimately counts most.

I believe that there is merit to both the assertion made by Aristotle as well as the claim made my Perelman. Indeed, there are fallacies that, under greater scrutiny, reveal themselves to be just that—fallacies. It is imperative for the audience to be able to wade through the manipulations of “fine language” and the assertions of the speaker in order to examine the real truth of an issue. In order to judge an argument right or wrong the tools of refutation (used in “‘attacking your opponent’s own statement’ ” (XXV)) discussed by Aristotle must be employed, not for the sake of argument but with the intent of revealing the truth.

Are logical fallacies different from rhetorical fallacies? I sincerely hope that there is a minimal difference between the two and that Aristotle's hard and fast rules are used when persuading a crowd. From what I understand, enthymemes are the short cuts rhetoricians use to get to the conclusion and engage their audience in the argument. If the short cut undermines a logical process and as a result creates a “logical flaw,” then it may be rhetorically effective, but I wouldn’t consider that morally correct. As rhetoricians, I don’t think it is enough to speak to an audience and persuade them if it comes at the cost of committing logical fallacies. We have the power to create enormous changes and affect the lives of many people. Rhetoric lives in the world of uncertainty and probability. This is a world where mistakes are inevitable and bad decisions are right around the corner. To me, it seems absurd to abandon the useful tool of logical reasoning when we are persuading individuals. A critical eye and ear can help make judicious decisions for both the advocate and the judge. To say that there is a ‘right or wrong’ in rhetoric is a difficult thing to prove. In many cases, it is probably impossible. We can, however, try to aim for “more correct” argument or side with the issue that provides the most evidence and logical backing.

I agree more with Perelman's idea that there are no hard and fast fallacies. An argument only seems fallible if the audience does not believe it. Therefore, if the audience holds the reasoning of the rhetorician to be true, then no fallacy has been committed. For example, if an argument is made that children who play video games are more likely to be violent in school, and the audience believes the argument, who is to say this isn't true? Therefore, if the audience agrees with the argument, the rhetorician has been effective. Now if the rhetorician makes an argument that A causes B and the audience does not believe him, then the argument has obviously been ineffective. An audience would judge whether the argument is right or wrong depending on their own life experiences. If a member of the audience has a child who plays lots of video games and has a history of violence in school, he will be more likely to accept the rhetorician’s argument as correct.

Instead of asserting that fallacies (save the one) never exist, perhaps it is better to say that fallacies (those occurring in reality, which is mostly what concerns Aristotle) rarely exist. For example, take the basic syllogism A implies B. In the abstract, B does not necessarily imply A, and it would be a fallacy to assume that it does. In other words, in theory, one can never make any assumptions about what B might imply about A, because to do so would be a fallacy. Yet in reality, it is very possible to make assumptions about what B might imply about A, without this assumption necessarily constituting a fallacy. For example: heavy smokers have a high risk of getting lung cancer. I believe that we can assume, though in formal logic this would constitute a fallacy, that those who have a high risk of getting lung cancer are probably smokers. At the root of this discussion is essentially the question, do the rules of formal logic have to apply to rhetoric?

The notion of a rhetorical fallacy is interesting, but a slight misnomer. By Perelman’s definition, a rhetorical fallacy does not only occur in a fallacious arguments, but will more often occur in perfectly valid arguments such as:

Everybody loves a lover.
I don’t love Mark.
…so Mark doesn’t love his wife.

Where all serious-minded members in the audience will be unwilling to grant the first premise, and maybe the rest of the audience too after teasing out the implications. ...I want to keep that example because I think it's funny, but I just realized it's bad because in order to keep the argument from being fallacious due to 'love' being used in different senses we would have to maintain that I don't LIKE Mark, and I do like and respect him him. But you see what I mean, right?

Since no one else has posted on this subject, I would like to start the discussion:

My argument to this is similar to what we talked about in class on Friday, it seems less that either Aristotle or Perelman were completely correct in their assertions, and that one could argue it is more likely to be a mixture of the two.

In the defense of Aristotle against Perelman, I believe that just because a certain audience might accept what another might consider a fallacy does not make the argument any less false, it just means that your audience agrees with you anyway. On the subject of "post hoc ergo propter hoc," it has also been stated that correlation does not imply causation. Just because some event follows another does not by any means imply that the first event was the cause.

For example: Proportionally, more cases of Attention Deficit Disorder (ADD) in children have been reported in the last 10 years than the years prior to that. In another study, it has been found that more children have attended high-school in the last ten years as well. With this argument you could imply that higher student attendance has caused the increase in ADD. Obviously this is a silly argument, because there are far too many variables and other factors that would need to be included if this assertion was to be taken seriously. This is the kind of thing one could get away with if we did not use the concept of logical fallacies.

Now, I do agree with Perelman in the sense that whatever your audience will agree with can be considered "correct" in a way, because you've already won their confidence on the subject. I do not believe that this justifies any decisions made by an audience persuaded with faulty logic, though. This kind of reasoning has lead to many terrible occurences in history where faulty logic was applied by rulers and agreed to by the audience. The best example of this is Hitler's Nazi Germany and the Holocaust following it. If we are to work towards a more peaceful future, we cannot allow any sort of logical fallacy to be used and not contested, especially on such a large scale.

Some fallacies are more easily "debunked" than others, but it should be a priority to test assertions made to an audience to verify their logic. If you are able to show the fallacy of at least one aspect of a particular argument, the veracity of the rest of the argument is thereby put into doubt. This is already used as a common strategy in debates we have today, and I don't see why we should discard the concept due to uncertainty of how 'effective' it might be to an audience. If you can reasonably show an audience why an argument, or any part of an argument is false, then I think that most people would be able to come to their own conclusions about why they might not agree quite so much about what they had previously "assumed." Assumptions can be used as a powerful tool, yes, but we all know the saying about what happens when one assumes. Sometimes it is necessary, for the good of the people, to prove a leader figure wrong when he is wrong, or at least not completely correct (playing on one's assumptions), and let the rest of us decide what that means for ourselves.