Weaver hierarchizes arguments into the top-tier (definition), the second-tier (analogy), and the lowest (cause/effect), saying that the noblest and the best (presumably the most virtuous) arguments invoke lofty ideals, defining the most important terms in a population’s vocabulary. Such arguments might include the provocative statement that all people are free. Or, with reference to a contemporary issue: Healthcare is a right, not a privilege. The lowest (least virtuous) arguments are those that appeal to circumstance. Such arguments might include the deflated claim that slavery does not improve the economic productivity of a society that depends largely on a series of distributed industries (some small-scale agriculture, some manufacturing, some service, etc.). Or, with reference to a contemporary issue: We should provide universal healthcare to U.S. citizens because, in the current global economy, U.S. workers are seeking foreign employment under governmental systems that provide them with the kind of security that they cannot receive in the U.S. market (retirement, healthcare, guaranteed quality education for their children, etc.). According to Weaver, what particularly is “higher” or “more virtuous” about the definitional as opposed to the causative argument? Why should we privilege the one over the other? Do you agree with his hierarchy? Why? Why not? Try to illustrate your argument with reference to a contemporary issue and the debate pertaining thereto.
Submitted by longaker on Fri, 09/28/2007 - 10:17am
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Longaker, Mark - RHE 321
The first thing that came to
The first thing that came to mind after reading this prompt was the abortion debate. It is interesting to me that once side defines itself as “pro-choice,” implying that the other side is “anti-choice” and also defines abortion as a choice, whereas the other side calls it self “pro-life,” which makes the other side “anti-life” and defines abortion as an act against life.
weaver argument
Weaver states arguments based on definition are of the highest order because the highest reality is being, not becoming. (1355) Cause and effect relationships, according to Weaver, are contingent upon the "attitudes of those who are listening will be affected according to whether or not they agree with our cause-and-effect analysis." (1354) In a sense I guess Weaver thinks definitions are less likely to be disputed than are cause and effect relationships.
I don't necessarily think we should use one over the other because, to be completely honest, I don't want to hear some one ramble on about what they believe their definition of something is. I'm pretty sure I can get that information on my own if I don't already have my own definition. I think cause and effect relationships can be just as disputed as definitions.
Ex. the definition of a terroristic threat. A normal person may think a terroristic threat is someone who, for example, threatens to blow up a building. After 9/11, airport security has changed so much that liquid filled containers on board are seen as potential terroristic threats.
Disagree...
I do not agree with Weaver's hierarchy. Although Definition is important, I think that cause/effect belong on a higher tier. Every effect (thing that occurs) was caused by something. The definition merely allows us to figure out what that thing is that was caused and to better understand its effect, possibly on the same accord as others.
Also, I do not find the example that "all people are free" as a good definitional argument. It's broad and abstract. When speaking in abstract terms, it leaves room for many different interpretations from the audience, which isn't a good thing. We always want our audiences to understand our point of view and to be able to grasp it without too much difficulty.
I disagree with Weaver's
I disagree with Weaver's hierarchy of arguments and his placement of cause-and-effect below definiton. Webster presupposes a universal truth to which definitional arguments can appeal, and seems to suggest that cause-and-effect arguments deal only in the realm of the possible. However, I believe the cause-and-effect arguments can be even more powerful than definitional arguments, because they can exist without the requisite assumption of definitional truths that there is a universal truth. Cause-and-effect arguments can be contextual: all it takes for them to be true is for the audience to grant the premises, keeping in mind that they can also be true if the premises appeal to a universal truth.
Weaver asks, “When one is
Weaver asks, “When one is asking men to cooperate with him in thinking this or doing that, when is he asking in the name of the highest reality, which is the same as saying, when is he asking in the name of their highest good?” (1355). He answers his own question soon after: “My personal reply would be that he is making the highest order of appeal when he is basing his case on definition or the nature of the thing” (1355). This is because “the highest reality is being, not becoming” (1355). The difference between a definitional and a causative argument is that “analogy is reasoning from something we know to something we do not know in one step; hence there is no universal ground for predication” (1355). So definitional arguments are purportedly true in and of themselves, whereas in regards to causative argument, we must use information we may not necessarily know. A definitional argument requires that the rhetor only reveal the truth to his audience. Causative arguments require some mental work from the audience; hence, there remains a possibility for misinterpretation. Working within Weaver’s framework of a hierarchical arrangement of basic forms of argument, his argument makes sense. Outside of this framework I can imagine a scenario in which a causative argument might be held with higher regard than a definitional one. The abortion debate immediately comes to mind. The definitional argument involves each definition the others’ position by means of their own labeling. For example, the Pro-choice side implies that the other side is against a woman’s fundamental right to choose. The Pro-life side implies that the other side is against life. Here however, an analogous argument may be more effective.
Weaver says, "The honest
Weaver says, "The honest rhetorician therefore has two things in mind: a vision of how matters should go ideally and ethically and a consideration of the special circumstances of his auditors." (pg.1355) I see how Weaver can argue that the definitional argument is "higher" than the cause and effect argument but I think, if utilized correctly, both can be equally efficent. It seems that Weaver is basically saying that a definitional argument is a sure one because it deals with what absolutely is. The cause and effect argument is not regarded as highly to Weaver because it is as he says, "preferred by those of a poetic or non-literal sort of mind." (pg.1356) To me, this translates that this kind of argument leaves much more room for generalities and abstractness. I agree with Heath's post about the question of how to categorize certain definitions such as that of the family. The definition of something will always depend on your target audience I suppose. For example, if you are speaking to a group of conservatives, it would probably be wise to not include gay marriage in your definition. The generalities that come with causative arguments leave more room for interpretation to the reader, which depending upon how used can be a good or a bad thing. I also agree with ssyed in that it could be possible that both forms of argument can work together to make for an persuasive argument.
definition
I believe that the cause and effect is a more concrete argument. The audience either agrees that the cause is rational and plausible or they don’t see the connection. According to Weaver, “Definition is an attempt to capture essence”. I believe Weaver is referring to a more abstract definition. For example, “All people are free”. What audience “people” constitutes and the definition of “freedom” leave room for further interpretation. This argument provides more room for interpretation to make connections and sway the audience. Therefore, it is more virtuous than the cause and effect argument because it has the capacity to appeal to more of the audience.
Coexistance of Virtues
I think it is relatively common to use the cause/effect appeal in order to define a lofty appeal through inductive reasoning. We often do we read editorials that require us to see a certain circumstantial situation such as John Edwards claiming that U.S. citizens under his health care plan must show up for preventative treatments in order to spark debates about the nature of health care, its purpose and role in society. It may be possible that the "highest" and "lowest" forms of virtue may work together to achieve a persuasive rhetorical effect.
While I was reading Weaver,
While I was reading Weaver, I disagreed with his hierarchy of arguments. There are definitely times when a cause and effect relationship is the most effective way to construct an argument. For example, teens who work more than 10 hours a week have been found to be much more likely to smoke, and therefore it is believed that teens are picking up this habit at work. One of the great things about this argument is that it illustrates a chain of events, and it is thus easier to determine the best next step. If teens are indeed picking up these habits at work, then something can be done about it. But when I think about the long series of disputes over cigarettes and their effect on health, I realize that the foundation for this argument and any progress it induces has also been laid by definition arguments. Before any course of action could be taken, there first had to be some degree of a consensus that smoking has a universally negative effect on a person's health, and some definition of smoking as harmful.
Flexible hierarchy
While Weaver makes sense, I also agree that different arguments are more effective on a situational basis. Especially cause-effect arguments. As we discussed in class earlier, humans seem to be wired to these kinds of relationships, and therefore it would be easier to pursuade people on that basis (generally). The definitional argument could be considered 'easier,' as your audience will either agree with you or not, but in this sense the cause-effect would have more room to pursuade your audience if they don't agree with you initially.
As kelli said with smoking, it's been disputed for a while. Even after agreeing on the definition of smoking as being harmful to one's health, people still smoke. Why? Is the argument not effective? It's effective; people know that smoking is bad, but since we are not completely rational creatures, as Weaver says, we must also be pursuaded through other means.
discussion leader post
According to Weaver, it is easy to comprehend what "exists absolutely." "Stipulative definitions are of the ideal, and in this fact lies the reason for placing them at the top of the hierarchy (1355)". Definitions deal with absolutes and are the nearest to knowledge of factuality and, for this reason, Weaver places this type of definitional argument at the top of the hierarchy. Weaver believes that the definitional arguement is "more virtuous" because "one way to interpret a subject is to define its nature- to describe the fixed features of its being (1354)". But what if something does not always have a definition?
I agree with Weaver's hierarchy to a certain point. Take for instance the idea of "family." Sociologists are challenged when studying the family because there is no clear-cut definition of what a family is. Sociologists continue to come up with theories, which propose different
relationships between the facts, but none of the theories has been able to withstand the test of time to ultimately come to be thought of as a "truth." The idea of what a true family is continues to change and can not be clearly defined. "Definitions accordingly deal with fundamental and unchanging properties (1354)". Is a family defined as a husband and wife with children? An unmarried couple raising one or the other's child from a previous
relationship? A man and his children from his first marriage along with his new wife and her children? How then can someone arguing for gay rights use the definition of family to say that what they are doing is either right or wrong?
Many issues today are being presented to us in the form of causative arguments. Obesity is a huge problem in America today. When trying to argue that obesity is bad, the definition means nothing. Of greater relevance are the effects of obesity. According to Weaver, ".. the first part would tell us why we must adapt ourselves to a fast-changing world; and the second would tell us the result of our doing so (1356)." An effective causative argument would tell us why we must change our eating habits and make lifestyle changes and then it would tell us what could happen if we either chose to (or chose not to) make a change. The health risks of obesity are infinite and the Bush Administration "stresses personal
responsibility to the virtual exclusion of strong governmental action on
nutrition (CSPI newsroom)."
Definition
I was trying to come up with a strong supportive argument for Weaver's decision that definition is the top-tier choice of argument, and I think heath's example of defining "family" is a good one. It illustrates that definitions are a much more concrete way to prove a point -- and by being the stronger argument, I say that they are rhetorically better. In the case of gay marriage, definition plays an important role: those against it would define marriage as a union between a man and a woman while those in favor would argue that it is a union of love between consenting adults.
Cause cases are more difficult to prove, and many of the issues brought up by the media today have a variety of debatable and interrelated causes. It is easier to convince a listener that obesity should be defined as a disease (and, therefore, as something undesirable that needs to be treated), which is clear when you think of the phrase "obesity epidemic." On the other hand, there is much debate about the causes of obesity, from school lunches to television to lack of parental involvement.
I also agree with Weaver's
I also agree with Weaver's hierarchy of arguments. At first I was thinking that cause/effect argument should really be at the top of the list, but when I tried to think of examples, I realized having a definition makes the argument for or against something seem more concrete. I was thinking about how so many kids these days are being diagnosed with ADD. It's easy enough to define ADD in medical terms, but as to the cause of the disorder and as to why it is becoming so prevalent in kids (or is at least being diagnosed more frequently) there is some debate. Is it the fact that recesses are getting shorter and shorter? Is it because kids play too many video games? Is it because schools are putting excessive amounts of pressure on kids in school? Or are school nurses and doctors simply defining ADD very loosely?
If a rhetorician is arguing against schools dishing out Adderall more often than Tylenol, cause and effect arguments will be helpful if he can argue the side effects of kids taking the drug or just to add something to his argument. But being able to define ADD in medical terms will force the audience to remember that ADD is a disorder, and just because a kid isn’t paying attention in class does not necessarily mean he fits the definition.
Definition + Cause and Effect
I tend to share the opinion that definition is extremely important, and perhaps more important, than cause and effect arguments. However, I wouldn't go so far as to say that it is superior to a causal argument. I think that definition is needed before we can even determine the cause and effect of something. That something must be defined and established as the undisputable essence of it before we can say that it caused something or was an effect of some cause. In this sense, I would consider them equal, as in, one must exist before the other can. But I wouldn't (as Weaver did) separate into tiers the two kinds of arguments.
More
I agree that a definition strengthens a causal arguement. In fact, I think that to make an effective causal arguement a definition is probably necessay. Otherwise too much is open to the audience's interpretation. So "obesity correlates to higher blood pressure", say, depends on what obesity really means.
why stip def above caus
In every case the audience is being asked to "agree with the speakers interpretation of the the world that is." [1048 ed.1]
I think that looking at a real (though not actual) example of argument might help us see that stipulative definition belongs higher on the list than causation. Say we are arguing about whether Susan, Karen, and their adopted son Michael constitute a family. I say, "Well look, the definition is of a family is 'a person with spouse and/or child(ren), whether living together or not'". If you conceed to this (that is - if and only if we have a stipulated definition) then the game is pretty much up because I only have to point to the fact that Karen's spouse is Susan and their child is Michael.
Causation on the other hand is really hard to understand. What is it for something to cause something else? I don't know. dictionary.com says a cause is "a person or thing that acts, happens, or exists in such a way that some specific thing happens as a result." So by not sending aid to starving children around the world am I a cause of their starvation? I'm causing an awful lot of stuff. This aside, lets say I try to argue by causation in some very weak sense (and probably do a horrible job of it) in saying
"Look- Susan, Karen, and Michael love each other in a very familial sense." You respond, "Ya, well they do seem to love each other as people in families are wont to do." I say, "So, they are a family." You still can say, "No, they just really wish they were a family. Being in a family does cause one to feel familial love, but the familial love felt between Susan, Karen, and Michael is just an offshoot of their really wishing they were a family."
So at first glance it seems like arguments from causation are less powerful than stipulated definitions because even when the causation is stipulated the argument doesn't necessarily come to conclusion.
Top-Shelf, Please.
It is both by means of, and because of a belief in the soul of man that Richard Weaver would have us agree with his appeal in the direction of a human-based reasoning that embraces the historical foibles that ultimately determine our hierarchy of values. He contends that defining a subject is most likely to capture the accurate version of the reality we inhabit. This is because it desires the essence of a subject. This essence is real, and the definition of a subject is an actuation of its "being-ness," as derived from the concreteness of history. It is real because what happened is all there is, and all that we have to go by, because it is the only thing that could have happened out of all the things that could have happened. Or, for those of a "poetic sort of mind" (1356), we have Joyce saying in a more non-literal, open-ended manner: "The void awaits surely all them that weave the wind."
By referring to a hierarchy of values constructed upon experiences with existentiality, instead of the scientific realm of the hypothetical, we are capable of immediately judging the value of a speaker's act. Since these acts of words are a reflection of his or her emotions, they are an expression of his or her humanism. In categorizing value to types of arguments, Weaver is in effect saying that we are capable of determining the value of a human being by judging the values they convey through their interpretation of reality. Because definition allows one to feel the most intimate with a subject and in the most accurate way; that is to say, the way that the character of a human being in a particular situation has actuated his experience into a attitude regarding a subject, it is most virtuous. The high virtue of definition is in its ackowledgement of the role that a society's values hold in arriving at any type of conclusion at any time. "Men are such because they are born into history, with an endowment of passion and a sense of the ought" (1359). What this really means is man is perfectly capable of being self-reliant in his choice of values, the highest expression of freedom in both the individual and in a nation.
The definitional is superior to the causative, quite simply, because it is more honest. Honest in the sense that a definitional argument refers to symbols whose properties are more "fundamental and unchanging" (1354) than those in a causative argument. This does not mean that the properties in a definitional argument will never change; they can and probably will. But when they do, it will be because of the gradual change in the assessment of the essence of a property, rather than by circumstance and convenience, two devices more prone to exploitation by way of a causative argument than a definitional one. A definitional argument is more honest because it accepts the validity of the "ought" (1359) with more passion. This passion every man and woman possesses, and will lead one to favor an ideal, or at least the search for one. Values are what we use to calibrate our individual souls' search for this ideal, and how can this be done but by what "is being, not becoming" (1355)?
There is one contemporary issue that strikes me as salient given the ideas contained in "Language is Sermonic," and that is the issue of pre-emptive war. Some in America consider this strategy to be irreconciliable with a nation that believes in "war as a last resort." The definitional argument of those who feel this way could be said to have arrived at this value-system based upon a historical tradition, perhaps enunciated best by Thomas Jefferson in his 1801 inaugural address: "Peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations – entangling alliances with none." Does a definition of pre-emptive war as something smacking of imperialistic blitzkrieg make it less likely to occur, or will a causative argument ( the cause of pre-emptive war was the effect of Saddam denying U.N. weapons inspectors access; the effect of pre-emptive war is a cause for more of it; i.e. Iran ) trump the definitional in certain cases? If we as a nation define our values in a more passionate manner, the effects of another pre-emptive war will demand more concrete causes. Certain things can obscure the vision and pursuit of an ideal; in this case, legitimate use of military force. A clear definition of America's military role and its limitations will be useful in countering the next cause-and-effect argument for pre-emptive war.