I agree with the analogy that Rhetoric is an art analogous to cooking. However, I think most reasonable beliefs are based on knowledge. Cooks add spices and cook food at certain temperatures because their beliefs are based on prior knowledge that this has worked before. Rhetoricians believe the most effective arguments are ones from definition, analogy, etc. because these have been effective in the past.

I agree with a lot of what has been said previously. Knowledge is recursive. It affects belief and beliefs are affected by knowledge. I think although the two are intertwined, they can be separated. Many times we disregard the knowledge that we know to be true. Take pathological fears of roller coasters for an example, no amount of knowledge the person acquires or repitition of the statistics will lessen their belief that they would fall out at the top. Sometimes we realize that our beliefs are irrational yet we continue to believe them anyway. We don't always behave according to logic.

"A person or a society’s beliefs are born from the knowledge they have acquired."

I agreed with you up until this point, actually. It has been my experience (and I'm pretty sure that there's at least one study on the subject) that what people "know" is colored by what they believe. Example: I knew a woman who hated Mexicans. She paid attention to only the news reports detailing violence and other problems within this ethnic group, managed to see only the Mexican men who got arrested and the women who let their children run wild at the store. The result was that her "knowledge" that the Mexican people are inferior to everyone else was only strengthened, because her beliefs colored the information she allowed to enter her mind.

I believe that belief *can* be separated from knowledge, but that the two are often intertwined. Therefore, it follows that I think the analogy itself is faulty; neither rhetoric nor cooking are based more in belief than knowledge (based on the first time I made a pumpkin pie without the recipe, cooking requires plenty of knowledge, and just as much memory as rhetoric).

Of course we can doubt the analogy and the assumption. We’re rhetoricians! I have yet to come across a case regarding anything that is a black and white as Socrates (or the question) would have us believe. Cooking is not the opposite of medicine. I think there must be a lot of context we are missing here. The opposite of medicine would be intentionally harming people. I suppose the opposite of cooking would be take out. I’ll be here all weekend. There are lots of ways we can discount Socrates’ arguments about rhetoric and its relationship to “the good.” Hobbes and to some extent Machiavelli and those who followed argued that there was no “the good.” That is, there is no absolute truth. We could argue that philosophy is on the same plane with rhetoric. That is, they both could be used for the purpose of undermining “the good.” We could take issue with what “the good” actually is. And so on.

As a response to the speculation about the relationship between knowledge and belief, I would have to say that, at least in the context of Plato, they can be separated. We do base our beliefs on the truths that we have come to expect from experience, but we can be misguided. Plato called knowledge justified true beliefs. I think of beliefs as Platonic forms(our own representations) of knowledge. Belief and knowledge may coincide, but really, who has the authority to definitively say?

It seems that the discussion post is in a state of disarray and I apologize for that as I ended up working an extra shift at work. In response to the discussion topic, I think that the dialogue between Socrates and Gorgias gets at the heart of the debate between philosophy and rhetoric. Is rhetoric just a filmy veneer for the beliefs of the orator or is there substance behind the orator’s words? Socrates doesn’t seem to think much of rhetoric based on the second assumption that belief can be separated from knowledge and subsequently rhetoric does not require knowledge or at least a lot of it in order to persuade the audience. This leads Socrates to conclude that just as cookery is pleasing to the audience, rhetoric also pleases the audience without necessarily requiring it to put forth what is just and true. Socrates gets away with many of these claims because Gorgias does such a poor job of defending his art. In defense of rhetoric, I believe there are reasons to doubt Socrates assumptions. We can discount Socrates comparison of cookery and medicine by pointing out that rhetoric requires the persuasion of a variety of individuals who may be knowledgeable about the topic at hand. In that case, mere “flattery” (97) may not be enough to persuade the audience just as a plate of greasy food may not convince the eater that the food is healthy for them no matter how appetizing it looks. In short, I think that Socrates underestimates the audience’s ability to judge arguments based on their previous knowledge. If that is the case, the audience is using its knowledge in order to form a belief thus melding the knowledge and belief together which may undermine Socrates second assumption.

Drawing on our readings of Crassus, it seems rational to have a rhetorician who is highly knowledgeable because they can then defend themselves from accusations of simply stating information without a solid basis in facts or ethics. If rhetoricians can then be wise and knowledgeable, it is possible that they can also be virtuous. Using Gorgias’ concessions, Socrates points out the contradictions in his speech by showing that Gorgias believes an orator is always just because he speaks on the topic of justice, yet he is capable of taking advantage of his power (95-96). Gorgias’ concession may be due to Socrates' careful questions, but like Gorgias stated, any skill such as boxing, poses the possibility to misuse that power (95). If that is the case, then even philosophy which focuses on virtue, truth and logic may have the ability to be misused. Although I don’t think Socrates is fighting a fair fight since Gorgias seems to be unable to anticipate any of Socrates’ questions, there is some merit in Socrates’ reasoning. Rhetoric without an emphasis on knowledge, virtue and “the good” is just a tool to manipulate the audience. Fortunately for rhetoricians, these values have been at the basis of their dialogue for centuries and even if they haven’t resolved the conflict between persuasion and virtue at least there is movement towards that direction.

First of all the format reminded me of a play, which made the reading go by quite fast but the dialog was sometimes hard to swallow because of the everyday language that was used . But I agree that it is hard to separate between belief and knowledge. The two seem to go hand in hand. Without one you don't have the other. So Socrates's assumption that the two can be separated can certainly be disputed. Socrates's claims that a rhetorician "knows what is just and unjust either previously or by learning afterwards from a teacher" therefore "he who has learned what is just is just" therefore "the rhetorician could never be guilty of wrongdoing." This claim is difficult for me to take. I think that it is possible for a rhetorician to be taught and know just things but not use his/her art in a fair way (as discussed on pg. 93)therefore he/she is not just.

I do not think that the word choices outlined in the translation of Plato should be over-analyzed. That said, I didn't particularly like the definition of the must-be-just rhetorician as set up through analogy. Man who has learned building... a builder, he who has learned music... a musician, he who has learned medicine... a medical man, he who has learned what is just... is just? I couldn't buy Plato's analogy here. It seemed to me that he who has learned justice (what is just) should, as defined through occupation, be a legislator/judge or some such. After all, a brick is not a builder, a song is not a musician, drugs are not doctors, nor is justice a legislator or judge. But ideally a builder does practice building, a musician create music, a medical man practice medicine. That said, the legislator or judge should create or enforce justice; however, it doesn't follow that they are just or will always do what is just. If anyone cares to try to articulate this thought in a more accessible fashion, please do so.

How can belief can be separated from knowledge? I would say that knowledge is just a collection of beliefs...this could end up being a really complex interpretation of belief, similar to I.A. Richard's treatment of words and language that mean little by themselves, but gain meaning through context and position.

Anyway, the way that Socrates sets up the question makes the two appear separate, but all knowledge is based on what is believed to be knowledge. Is the sky blue? The grass green? This depends if I believe that blue is the color blue, and not actually the color red. Beliefs shift across societies and cultures, religions, et al, and so what one society would consider to be knowledge about a given subject would depend on their belief systems. Christians know that Jesus was the son of God, and Jews and Muslims also know that he was not. These are based on beliefs and the knowledge they have of their respective holy tomes. Thus, what they consider to be good is based on knowledge that arises from their beliefs and vice versa. Socrates' understanding of what is "good" is also based on his beliefs, so while he may believe he is right about rhetoric, I'd say that his correctness depends on just what good is considered by any given society to be.

I'd say that there is no subject that can be considered to be known and observed the same way across the human spectrum, but this does not mean that beliefs have to be completely and infallibly understood in order to be useful. Just look at how technology has improved the human condition, even though technically, no theory has been (or for that matter can be) proven.

Where are you guys?

Anyway, since Heath did the first point, I'd like to say that this belief in a sense is based off of knowledge. Gorgias and Pollus' rhetor would pursuade any audience to believe him, even though he had no knowledge, but I think it's because they would believe him to be the more knowledgeable in the argument. His argumentation is good therefore he must know well that which he speaks. The doctor does speak through knowledge, but the rhetor's words sound more "knowledgeable" through his powers of pursuasion.

So, the assumption too can be doubted.

I think we can doubt the analogy. Unless the cook advertises his food as particullarly healthy, we should claim that cookery appeals to knowledge of what tastes good and is not extremely unhealthy or poisonous, rather than pretending "to know what foods are best for the body." As a rhetor should be informed from professionals of whatever area in which she argues, a cook who claims to make healthy food should be informed by a nutritionist (or in antiquity: a doctor) about what foods are good/bad for the body and un/healthy ways to prepare them.