Locke argues that the most verifiable and reliable words are those connecting to simple ideas in the mind of the speaker and thereby also to simple experiences of real objects in the empirically observed world. This is why the words most open to confusion are those referrig to mixed modes and to complex ideas—these mental constructions often have no “originals in nature” (p. 818). Compounding the indirect or the complete lack of reference in language, there is also the civil use of words, which relies on common definitions that often contradict one another and are applied loosely. Based on all this, Locke sez we can rely on words like “white,” “sweet,” and “bitter,” but not on words like “modesty” and “frugality.” When we encounter the latter, we must insist on specific definitions. So, Locke—like Plato and Weaver—insists on definitions, but can we say that he insists on definitions for the same reason as Plato and Weaver? Do Lockean definitions refer to Platonic ideals? Do they refer to values and emotional investments? Or do they refer to simple ideas (which themselves refer to simple experiences of real events in the world)?
The hump Locke wants to get over is the one that has rudely imposed itself between knowledge and language. Lockean definitions would subordinate "wit and fancy" to "dry truth and real knowledge." This applies to mixed modes, used for philosophic purposes, as there is nothing too fancy about words that describe things easily understood, typically occuring in the civil realm. John Locke, and other champions of the new science, deplored the obfuscation of truth that the ornamented language of rhetoric, with all of its non-signified ideas, distributes throughout the public. Lockean definitions aim at the same thing that Plato did: truth. The difference is that Plato thought the good rhetorician would use rhetoric to assist in discovering truth, whereas Locke thought that rhetoric simply hid it from view. Weaver, I suppose, would be content to have the definitions that either men would offer, so long as they were in accordance with established values and modes of thought.
It seems that Locke's reliance on definitions is actually very different from that of Plato and Weaver. Locke's definitions depend on the concrete: what we can know for sure by observation, and a definition of something is its 'lowest common denominator' of attributes. Plato, on the other hand, in his search for ultimate truths relies on the abstract, and also on universality, something that Locke admits is useful, but ultimately not the best way to establish a definition.
Its interesting to me this this relationship between many modern and classical thinkers seems to establish itself on a number of levels. Classical thinkers appear to pursue lofty ideals in government, virtue, philosophy and such; while Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke and the like set the bar at quite a low level, but one that's achievable for all.
Locke's definitions do not seem to be placed on ideals as Plato's are. Instead they are more based on observable characteristics like color or weight. Plato is more concerned with what a thing really is outside of human perspective, while Locke is more concerned with human knowledge and experience of things.
Locke does not insist on definitions for the same reasons as Plato. Definitions for Locke are found through our sense perception, not through elenchus. Something is called something because we all agree that it should be called whatever it is called independent of any explicit “finding out” process. Locke seems to say that why we agree doesn’t matter so long as we agree. But he also expects everyone to agree on the same basic things.
I agree with Locke's idea that words and/or their definitions have naturally no signification; but only to the extent where he illustrates the "natural causes of their imperfection in those that stand for mixed modes." For example, I agree with the idea that it can be a bit intricate when "the signification of the word and the real essence of the thing are not exactly the same."
I made an argument against Weaver's hierarchy for many of the same reasons that Locke emphasizes, so I understand his position unquestionably.
But then again, I think that in Locke's case, him only being able to rely on words such as: “white, sweet, and bitter" definitely refers to "simple ideas (which themselves refer to simple experiences of real events in the world)." Because surely there are other words that are just as significant, but expound more indepth to context, that can be relied on.
In response to Chris's comment, I started counting while reading and its more like 50. Yep. That's quite a few.
I agree that in some situations more precise definitons would be helpful in communication. But even if language was modified for clarification, I don't think it could eliminate all degrees of ambiguity. Personal experience with a word can shape and change it's meaning to one unique from anyone else in an audience.
Going along with what Kelli mentioned-- although we do not always have precise definitions- we continue to look at the similarities and differences between ideas in order to break apart and classify them into pre-defined categories that are somewhat universally agreed upon.
It is true that Locke relies on definitions, but I would say for a very different reason than Weaver and Plato. Calling language an imperfect medium with which to convey ideas, Locke would probably not think of definitions as a way of approaching Plato's conception of absolute truth, because his Lockean definitions are composed of numerous "simple, universal" words a la "sweet" et al, and the accumulation of these words from person to person words will ultimately be, according to him, never exactly the same (as in the gold/liquor examples). However, for the sake of conversational brevity, clarity, and efficacy, long-winded explanations must be avoided and definitions referred to, or the speaker will never accurately convey what is in his mind to the mind of a listener. This creates a bit of a conundrum as far as communication, as it seems that the speaker will never really be able to effectively communicate abstractions...only the agreed basic words for directly experienced sensations.
Lockean definitions also differ from Weaver's in that Weaver believes that the essence of truth exists within the definition itself; the very existence of a definition is itself virtuous because it attempts to lock in on some essence of truth. But it seems that Locke believes the opposite; the simple mode conveys the ideas and infallible truths that everyone observes and can agree upon, but the view becomes more myopic and less truthful as definitions become more mixed and ambiguous.
I think that simple modes may approach the very basic Platonic ideals because they are experienced the same way by most people (save colors for the blind and sounds for the deaf, as in Locke's example), but as definitions arise and combine these modes, ideals like Justice, frugality and modesty cannot be discovered in conversation because of the destructive nature of language. Locke seems to be implying that what is in the mind of the wo/man is what exists, and is what is true. A perception cannot be false...but conveying it with the imperfect mediums of language and discourse makes it les s true. Like Plato, he may believe that truth can only be pursued and reached in the absence of discourse and communication...a solo journey of the mind, if you will.
I'm not really sure how I feel about all this...Locke doesn't seem to have a good opinion of Rhetoric. I think that in our modern world there are certain phenomena that we may experience and not know how to respond to initially. I heard a story about a group of Brazilian jungle natives who were brought to New York City on a plane and thought that the airplane was a god. In this case, conveying definitions would enhance their understanding of flight, machinery and science (maybe), especially if the person explaining was skilled in clear and effective communication enhanced by studies in rhetoric. Definitions may be ambiguous, but there is a degree of mutual understanding in a lot of them, which I think speaks well for language as a tool to preserve ideas.
Locke and Weaver seem to be referring to definition with different objectives. Weaver approaches definition through the lens of a rhetorician. He wants us to use to take advantage of the audiences previous connotations of a particular word and run with it. Locke questions the very assumption that the audience may have a single determined connotation of a word because language is an arbitrary tool to convey thought ideas. When I hear someone speaking in a different language, it sounds like complete gibberish to me. I then begin to learn the language and learn the words for things that I can physically understand such as pen, book, table. From there, it gets complicated because if I learn a word like "justice," the notion of justice may be something that I personally decide and since there are so many facets of "justice" just as there are so many facets to the word "murder" I may never draw up the exact same image that my friend will who learns the same word. Well, I kind of got side-tracked, but my point is that Locke isn't speaking from a rhetorician's perspective. Instead, he is tearing down our understanding of definition to show us that one should be careful when using something as unreliable as language. Unfortunately for this class, words happen to be our specialty.
Locke – like Plato and Weaver – insists on definitions. He does not insist on definitions for the same reason as Plato and Weaver however. Locke insists on definitions in order to reduce the level of abstraction of the word, or idea. In other words, to further simplify the term. “The imperfection of words is the doubtfulness or ambiguity if their signification.”
Platonic idealism is the theory that the substantive reality around us is only a reflection of a higher truth. That truth, Plato argued, is the abstraction. He believed that ideas were more real than things. Locke not only focuses on precision, but he believes that abstraction in words further muddle the mind and steer us away from the search for true knowledge. “I mean such use of them as may serve to convey the precise notion of things, and to express in general propositions certain and undoubted truths, which the mind may rest upon and be satisfied with in its search after true knowledge”.
Lockean definitions do not refer to values and emotional investments but rather to simple ideas, which themselves refer to simple experiences of real events in the world. “What the word murder, or sacrilege, &c., signifies can never be known from the things themselves… the intention of the mind, or the relation of holy things, which make a part of murder or sacrilege, have no necessary connection with the outward and visible action of him that commits either.” According to Locke, religious values and emotional investments involved in a sacrilegious act such as murder are not visible in the act, therefore making it a faulty definition of the act and further contributing to the imperfection of words.
I think that insisting on definition for the sake of communication is similar in Locke, Plato, & Weaver. Locke is disimilar in that he does want to define in effort to discover Platonic Ideals. He does not think we can discover such ideals. Locke says something along the lines of - strictly speaking, I don't see my dog, I just see patches of color; I don't hear my dog, I just hear the sounds that it makes.
It can be helpful to explain to someone who is not a full-fledged realist that what Plato thinks has the most reality are what we generally think of as abstractions from real things. That what we generally think of as real things, Plato thinks of as impressions of reflections of real things. But though we of the empiricist tradition would think of platonic ideals as abstractions, Plato doesn't think people's ideas or abstractions are what the forms are - Plato is an extreme realist in that he believes ideals or archetypes REALLY do exist in some place that really does exist - platonic heaven, or higher reality, or whatev. He thinks we participate in them in some strange way that can be read about in the "Phaedrus"
This kind of thing always makes me wonder if we could ever settle on definitions for words that could be considered concrete and everlasting, like when you say "murder" and everyone gets the same idea. I think the only way to do something like that would be to include extensive grammar changes that would 1. be flexible and allow for new additions and 2. each new addition would convey one specific meaning. I realize this would cause our language to become extremely bloated with these new versions of words, but I wonder if anything like it will ever be possible in our future. Shall we always fail to interpret each other correctly?
I think it would be impossible for everyone to agree upon a definition, especially one of the complex ideas that Locke writes about like murder or justice. We have all had different experiences in life, and as a result we are all bringing different thoughts to the table when we think of a word or an idea. I don’t think this is a bad thing because it’s always good to get different perspectives on things, and I don’t think it causes serious voids in communication. Like Niki said, we are still able to form friendships and communicate with people even though we may not all have the exact same reactions to words and ideas: we can still function as a society without having to agree completely with someone else’s definition.
While I agree with Locke that certain definitions are vague in that they don't make everyone think of the exact same idea, I would also argue that we don't really *need* "concrete and everlasting" definitions for words. We may not always understand each other perfectly, but the fact that society functions and that we can form friendships proves to me that this perfect understanding is not a necessity. Further, that John Locke wrote and published an essay about this topic which has been read and (apparently) understood by many readers makes me consider exact definitions even less necessary.
Right. I agree; certain definitions are vague, but they always will be. I admire Locke and stand behind him optimistically speaking, because "concrete and everlasting" ideas would be great. The ultimate result would be that we would always know exactly what we are talking about when we use a certain word. But realistically speaking, I see NikiZD's opinion as closer to the way it is and always will be: we may not always understand each other perfectly, and I'll go further to say that we will never understand each other perfectly. In light of that, we should realize that because we don't have "concrete and everlasting" definitions for certain words does not mean that readers will never see the true meaning in something. Again, like NikiZD said (and I'm paraphrasing), we all understood what he meant, so doesn't language as a whole cover those instances in which an idea could be vague. That is, don't words in conjunction with one another cover the gray areas?
Well, I think if we could understand each other better, maybe Locke wouldn't have to use the word "signification" so many times in his essay. That in itself would make the world a slightly better place.
edit: has anyone counted? I'm pretty sure he uses it over 20 times. That's pretty... significant.
Plato wants to establish definitions to establish truth. Locke seems less optimistic about finding the truth by means of language due to its ambiguity. I think Locke relies on experiences and tangible things to establish basic definitions everyone can agree on.