I think Nietzsche’s claim about the good of the “rational man” is that he is all we have. There is no empirical truth; indeed for Nietzsche there is no truth at all. The “rational man” is the formulation of ourselves necessary to get through our lives with such “foresight, prudence, and regularity.” So in this scenario empirical truth isn’t needed and isn’t even necessarily desirable; the same is true for any other sort of truths.

Would it not be disingenuous for anyone such as Nietzche--who attempts to understand the world and convey his understanding to an audience--to completely dismiss the utility of the paradigm that the metaphors give to our life? When Nietzche attempts to define our perception as a collection of metaphors, is he not attempting to uncover and explain the TRUTH of our perception? I believe that Nietzche has no choice but to (at least) accept the utility of Locke's rational man.

I would also like to point out that Locke and Nietzche exhibit certain similarities: they both question the definitions of abstract nouns like "honesty" or "pride" and point out that the coventional definitions are really a meaningless collections of relative associations. To me this point is important; I think that in our speech today we rely too much on the connotations we expect words to evoke, rather than what they really mean. For example, what does it mean to be "proud to be American?" It is a phrase that invokes plenty of positive feelings, but I think that its definition is not easy to uncover, despite its widespread use. Nietzche and Locke both argue against the reliance on conventional and cliched assumptions all too common in our modern dialogue.

My answer to the question of the purpose of the rational man is that we have nothing else. Our system of metaphors is the only means we have to live our life, and so we have no choice but to accept it and work within it. Our search for truth is, i think, a recognition that there is something more, and thus not at all a contradiction but an affirmation of Nietzche's understanding of the world.

Finally, an article by Stanley Fish in today's NY Times:
http://fish.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/10/21/george-w-bush-and-melvilles-aha...

Regarding Nietzsche’s feelings toward the rational and intuitive man, I came to pretty much the same conclusions as Heath. I don’t think he really preferred the rational to the intuitive man – ultimately they’re both doomed to miscommunication. And maybe it’s just because I’m feeling nihilistic myself tonight, but I also don’t think that it matters if our categories of things line up with their true natures, if our labels of leaves really match what it means to be a leaf. From the stand point of language, as long as people understand each other most of the time, language is effective. Perhaps they don’t. Nevertheless, I think we are capable of understanding each other most of the time given the proper ‘metaphors’ and a whole lot of time, so language itself is effective and we might as well keep using it.

Also, it’s always seemed to me that Nietzsche himself didn’t really view anything other than with detached amusement. Case in point: the follies of the rational or intuitive man. And his mustache. That thing’s taking over his face. (seriously, google him.)

I don't think Nietzsche says that the rational person's way of striving at truth is really better. Just that it has a tendency to keep them and others alive longer. To me he seems to extol the "intuitive" person's colorful, though more disaster-prone, life.

We posit 'things-in-themselves' or 'essences' so that we can claim things don't go out of existence every time we aren't perceiving them. Though nothing can prove things-in-themselves exist, positing them makes our systems of belief more powerful and more simple. When we are talking about leaves we never think we are talking about the properties of the things-in-themselves that could not ever be experienced, just those properties that are experienced.

We have to represent our experiences/ideas with symbols, there is some arbitriety to the division, and we'll never understand each other (or ourselves?) perfectly, but we communicate. I couldn't make a sincere argument that I would be better off if we didn't have the symbols - life would be "nasty, brutish, and short."

"But man has an invincible inclination to allow himself to be deceived and is, as it were, enchanted with happiness when the rhapsodist tells him epic fables as if they were true, or when the actor in the theater acts more royally than any real king." Nietzsche seems to be saying that man can't help but be lied to. Man cannot find the absolute truth by simply experiencing things, he must be able to convert those experiences into a fine kind of language in order to come closer to the truth. I agree with onholliday that there is a lie that exists in the "rational man" and the "intuitive man". Overall, I don't think that Nietzsche agrees with Locke's argument or the utility of it. The rational man is still good because according to N the rational man strives to obtain the truth in better ways than others, therefore has a better grasp on what the truth is.

Nietzsche begins by pointing out the futility and vast insignificance of man in relation to the universe and time. Interestingly, we are still proud creatures despite our insignificance. More importantly, our skills seem to be dependent on lying, deceiving, back stabbing etc. and yet we have this surprising obsession with the truth. We try to discover truth by experiences and convey it with language, but terms like "leaf" are unable to relay the exact meaning to each individual. Ultimately, it doesn't matter too much because it is a method of control just like philosophy that humans use to make sense of the world, however ineffective or imprecise it may be. At the end of the day, if I want to convey the exact meaning of a leaf that I picked up, I won't say "leaf" I will say "Oh, it was a green maple leaf about the size of my hand and if appropriate, I might give measurements. Sure, it isn't exactly precise, but by using other concepts and terms, I'm able to sufficiently give the meaning to my audience which is good enough to me and I think Nietzsche is alright with that. We have to live in a world knowing that our experiences are not exact and that they may not actually yield truth, but concepts we use are still useful to gain control of our environment and life.

This took longer to formulate than I thought it would. Should have expected it, with Nietzsche.

It seems to me that ultimately Nietzsche does accept the utility of Locke's empirical project, but simultaneously can see the underlying flaw. The import lies in Nietzsche's ability to unravel our ideas of simplicity, discuss at length why they are incorrect or overly simplified, and then step back and recognize the position that places one in. To live entirely cognizant of the fact that no leaf is just a leaf, or that nothing you say can ever precisely refer to the object which you are envisioning or referring to, would likely cause some kind of serious communication issue (that is to say, one greater than the idea that we're never really communicating in the way we expect) in society and indeed could endanger one's ability to function properly in society at large.

Right now, I could have been concerned that you were thinking of "society at large" in an entirely different context than I mean it - and indeed, you might be. I would probably end up spending far too much time either trying to erase the multiplicity of ideas which that refers to, and come to some kind of consensus, or I'd just spend a lot of time describing what that means to me. However, as it stands, it's not central to my argument, and thus it seems the import of the rational man, regardless of his access to empirical truth, is that he can both see where these issues arise from and note them - but then sidestep them and continue to function in a capacity which allows him to interact with other humans. Not to say I accomplish that, only that it was an immediate example.

Perhaps this is how Nietzsche recognizes the utility of the rational man - as fully aware of the problems of assuming that language is anything but a lot of vague references to specificities we could not begin to approach, but also aware of the imperative ability to act rationally and use those vague concepts as best one can, in the interest of living/thinking as close to the ideal as possible without surrendering one's ability to functionally live. That's the good of the rational man if he can legitimately accomplish understanding and then overlook it in the everyday, but essentially it's also important to note that in either case Nietzsche addresses in the latter few pages there is a lie inherent in some part of their existence. I don't think he values the rational man above the free intellect, but I do think he understands that the rational man is at least closer to ideal than the intuitive man.

I'm not sure how much sense that made, but here's hoping.

I think Nietzsche (N) is debunking Locke's empiricism because he doesn't think it has any utility. When N says on pg. 1176 that "Science will be able to dig successfully in this shaft forever, and all the things that are discovered will harmonize with and not contradict each other," he is asserting that the attempt to unify conception and communication in the pursuit of true knowledge will still require a reliance upon metaphor. It's just that the metaphors of science are more clearly defined in an anthropomorphic sense; a more complete "metamorphosis of the world into man." The taxonomic schema of biology, even at its most particular (species), still does not capture the precise essence of a creature. Perhaps relative to other creatures it does, but then this essence is founded upon a comparison to something that it is not, which is a type of metaphor. When N speaks of the rational man helping us navigate our lives with foresight, prudence, and regularity, this man "who governs himself by concepts," he is alluding to the man who clings onto and adds to the framework that defines our relation to the world. The rational man is useful because s/he adheres to concepts that are the closest thing we have to believing we are not being deceived by ourselves. This man or woman is useful in a situation that requires at least the appearance of mastery; that is to say, an allegiance to the anthropomorphic/empirical world. I think N is questioning the validity of a human truth about the non-human world. I think he's saying that life is a perpetual metaphor, and any belief in a truth is simply obedience to an illusion, a voluntary deception because without it we'd go mad. I think N thought that the man committed to empirical truth was just making a last stand. He distrusts Locke's empiricism for its smug self-assuredness; he questions its promises of total rationality (he believes in total irrationality, but not in its usefulness). In N's mind, Locke's empirical project is a will to power that has no chance of attaining the throne, only a cardboard cut-out of one. I also think N smoked alot of opium.